Financial Accounting
Azam Valizadeh Larijani; Farzaneh Yousefi Asl; Fatemeh Shirzadi; Niloofar Zamani
Abstract
One of the reports that companies are required to publish at the discretion of the Securities and Exchange Organization is the management interpretive report. Therefore, in this research, the relation between the presentation of management interpretative reports by companies and earnings management has ...
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One of the reports that companies are required to publish at the discretion of the Securities and Exchange Organization is the management interpretive report. Therefore, in this research, the relation between the presentation of management interpretative reports by companies and earnings management has been investigated. Also, considering the importance of the role of women in improving the financial reporting of companies, the effect of the presence of women in the board of directors on the aforementioned relation has been investigated. The statistical population of this research is the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange and the Iranian Fara burse during the years 2011 to 2022. The hypotheses of this research have been tested using linear regression. The results of the research showed that the provision of interpretative management reports by companies has reduced earnings management. Also, the decrease in earnings management is more among companies that have used the presence of women among their board members.
Mohsen Khoshtinat; Fereshteh Yoosefi
Volume 5, Issue 20 , January 2008, , Pages 37-59
Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between information asymmetry and accounting conservatism in financial statements. Information asymmetry between informed and uninformed equity investors creates an agency cost that ...
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This paper studies the relationship between information asymmetry and accounting conservatism in financial statements. Information asymmetry between informed and uninformed equity investors creates an agency cost that increases the equilibrium return on the firm's equity. This effect gives parties to the firm an incentive to generate a mechanism that reduces information asymmetry. In the other hands Conservatism reduces the manager's incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and then reduces the agency costs.
Our empirical tests express that information asymmetry among equity investors is significantly positively related to conservatism. Further our tests confirm that changes in information asymmetry between equity investors lead changes in conservatism but conservatism doesn't lead to information asymmetry.
This result rejects the FASB proposition that conservatism produces information asymmetry among investors.
